I Probably Won't Be Dessert . . .

Justin here. Professor Jeremy Seigel recently pointed out the difference between the fear of unemployment vs the reality of unemployment here:

"The June unemployment rate touched 9.5%, and it is quite possible that that rate will eventually exceed the 10.8% rate reached in November 1982. But even if it does, unemployment will rise, at most, 2 percentage points, far less than the reported 30% to 40% of workers who fear they will be laid off. And as the economy mends, the fear of being unemployed will subside, and consumption will rise."

Professor Seigel has forgotten more than I'll ever know about economics, but I have to (very respectfully) disagree. I think it’s unrealistic to think that Joe Consumer could have 10-20% more friends, family, and co-workers lose their jobs and then somehow he'll then breathe a sign of relief and start spending because some economists think that unemployment is already far above normal. I think Joe is going to pretty scared for a pretty good while.

It’s like being in a pit of lions that, on average, will eat no more than one human in a sitting. I don’t know about you, but if I’m stuck in there and two of my buddies were just eaten (mind you that's 100% above the average), mean reversion and bell curves won’t make me any less likely to need a clean pair of underwear.

What’s Really Important: Price, Moat, and Uncertainty

Jonathan here.  Been a busy quarter migrating to our new investment platform.  Been meaning to post our 1st quarter Market Commentary since April when we wrote it.  2nd quarter Market Commentary in the queue. 

I have a pair of Skyline 16x50 binoculars that belonged to my father-in-law, Conley. They feel great hanging around my neck or in my hands (certainly due more to my fond memories of their former owner than the superior design of their manufacturer.) Even though they are decades old, the magnification and width of field are superb. There’s just this one tiny problem: they create just enough double vision that you have to close one eye when you look through them. I still remember having to use them as a monocular so I could see Sam Snead lay up close to the pin on the 18th green at Sedgefield Country Club when Conley and I went to the Greater Greensboro Open years ago.

A while back I tried fixing my binoculars’ cockeyed view. Perhaps an objective lens or eye piece was cross threaded. Nope, they were screwed in fine. Asking myself “What’s the worst that could happen?” I took them all the way apart. Four tiny screws later, cover plates removed, I saw the problem: there were four prisms, seemingly held tight with little set screws, until one prism jiggled loose. Just one misaligned prism resulted in the distorted view.

I was reminded of my binoculars after an attorney friend of mine told me about a presentation he’s been giving to area banks. He’s committed to helping them work through this financial crisis and see the future of banking. When he talks, he holds a prism up high. He tells the bankers, “If you look straight ahead, where you’re accustomed to looking, you won’t see what’s straight ahead. If you want to accurately see what’s ahead, you need to turn the prism.”

Many of the troubles we’re experiencing in our economy are due to our nation’s tendency to look straight ahead and miss it. For example, we saw that Lehman Brothers was leveraged 25 to 1 while many investors and talking heads didn’t blink an eye because that’s how investment banks have always operated. And for years consumers shunned saving, but rather lived on their home equity and credit cards because their home values always went up and cheap credit was always available. And in the last year, we saw that a bank could combine a few BBB issues into a new CDO and the rating agencies would suddenly call it AAA because it was now a new security that was “relatively” safe. On the surface, these examples might look like instances of hindsight being 20/20, but they are really instances of past foresight being more like 20/180.

I wish we could say that, as advisors, our vision has always been stellar, but we can also be guilty of “looking straight ahead and missing it.” What is more important, though, is that we’re willing to open up the binoculars, adjust the appropriate screws, and go on viewing the golf match. We think the only thing worse that looking through a broken pair of binoculars would be to think either: a) we’ll get lucky and the golf ball might just roll into view or b) the binoculars are going to fix themselves.

So, what prism tweaks have we set into motion? They can be summed up in six areas: Price, Moat, Uncertainty, Dividends, Diversification and Safety. We’ll give some details of the first three in this commentary and the next three in the following commentary. If you can’t wait until next quarter to read about them, let us know and we’ll send you our thoughts ahead of time, or we can sit down and talk about them face to face.

Price. For years, price was our (and many other value investors’) end-all, be-all. We’ve been intent on buying “dollar bills for 50 cents.” The focus in this approach is more heavily on the stock and less so on the business. The problem is that this approach alone can lead to casualties if the investment’s time horizon and risk tolerance isn’t aligned with the investor’s time horizon and risk tolerance. We are still like a budget conscious grocery shopper: we know that it makes sense to buy cheap produce that has a few bruises on it, but we’re also conscious of some other factors that should get equal weight.

Moat. Moving up our chain of importance is a focus on a business’ economic moat. Warren Buffet said that a moat protects a “valuable and much sought after business castle.” Moats can come in many forms such as a well-known brand name, superior pricing power, or a large portion of market demand. While they come in many forms, all moats contribute to a common result: a company that is more likely to be in control of its own destiny. We recognize that there is plenty of money to be made in businesses without moats (many of us have built our livelihoods working for “no moat” companies). However, in this environment where the rules seem to change daily and confidence is here one day and gone the next, we believe it is wise to limit the number of factors that are outside of a business’ control.

Uncertainty. Another area garnering more weight in our process, is our level of uncertainty regarding the potential value of an investment. When I took up softball in my early forties, having never played baseball as a kid, my batting philosophy was this: close your eyes and swing, repeat if necessary. In investing, we have more control over the certainty of outcomes than I did in the batter’s box. Before we invest, we can choose to swing for either “homeruns and strike outs” or “singles and doubles”. Granted, sometimes swinging for singles and doubles will end up in a homerun and sometimes it will end up in a strikeout, but most of the time it’ll turn out just as intended: singles and doubles. Since our primary job is to help our clients sleep well at night, we are inclined to invest where we have a lower degree of uncertainty about the potential outcomes.

The most frequent question we’ve fielded after talking about any tweaks to our investment strategy is “isn’t this like shutting the barn door after the horse is already out?” It’s a great question; one we’ve thought through extensively. Our best answer is this: if someone would ring a bell today and announce with 100% certainty that the stock market can’t go any lower and we’ll have full recovery within months, then we would invest differently. The reality is that we haven’t heard any such bells announcing anything of the sort and, frankly, we could still see more unnerving news on the horizon.

We still think today is a great time to own U.S. equities, particularly companies with the qualities mentioned above (historically low prices, sizeable moats, and low uncertainty.) The potential returns we could see over the next ten years could be at levels not seen in generations. The problem is that we don’t all have ten year time horizons, and even if we do, the volatility is hard to stomach. This brings us back to the other three “prism tweaks” we’ve already put in place and we’ll cover next quarter: Dividends, Diversification, and Safety. These three allow us to (respectively): get paid to wait, smooth out the bumpy ride, and seek superior risk-adjusted returns. Again, our primary job is to help our clients sleep well at night and now, more than ever, that means investing for the upside and protecting against the downside.

Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right - Pension Insurance

Pension insurer shifted to stocks - The Boston Globe
Posted using ShareThis

The article above gives me a pit in my stomach on a number of levels, but one in particular. I think most people would get sick thinking of the money already "lost" . . . I get sick thinking about the money that might not be gained.

I'd like to think that the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp would operate under some pretty standard advice: if you need money in the next 5 years, maybe you shouldn't have it in stocks. I do think they need to be proactive and estimate if they'll have an onslaught of pensions to back and see if that changes their time horizon, but they also need to be able to face reality. With valuations where they are, it might very well make sense to "stay put" and not have Congress reallocate your portfolio.

As we say here: "Two wrongs don't make a right." From this observer's point of view, it seems like shift back to the old strategy right now might be wrong #2.

Note: The author recognizes that he does not possess the right mix of qualifications, connections, and unconfessed past sins that is required to work for the PBGC, the Government Accountability Office, or the Congressional Budget Office. Therefore, his opinions are merely that and should not be applied to your investment strategy or the government's investment strategy for that matter and frankly he's surprised you're reading this fine print.

Feeling Like the Dryer Ate My Socks AND My Stocks

[UPDATED: I originally posted the entire article from investopedia here, but after brushing up on my copyright rules and regs (thanks to a couple colleagues) I've removed the article and just linked to it. Oops. Better safe than sorry.]

Justin here. I ran across a great article on investopedia.com (you can find the original here) that talks about where all our stock value "went".

The take-home is this: when so much of a company's stock price is determined by perception, there is real value and security in investing in companies that will pay you a dividend. People can argue all day long whether a stock is worth $5 or $50, but it is impossible to argue about the real value of the dividends that just landed in your account.

Once you start focusing on dividends, the main question becomes: "is this company (stock) able and inclined to pay a stable, meaningful, and growing dividend?"

We think that's a whole lot more productive and easier to determine than the non-dividend approach where the sole question is: "is this company going to be worth substantially more on the day I need to sell it?"

I lost the toss

Jonathan here. My February 3 post, Will the Dow Set a New low in 2009, is the most stupid post I've ever written. Not because my thesis was wrong (it was), but in our line of work, focusing on process over outcome is what it's all about, and in the clarity of hindsight, I was focusing on outcome not process. So now that I've had my whipping, eaten crow, and been avoided at the water cooler by my colleagues, I wanted to share just a bit about what we know and think about market sentiment, or more precisely, investor sentiment. Sage investors know investors become buyers when the consensus gets cheerful. Warren Buffett said "you pay a high price for a cheerful consensus." Ben Graham, Buffett's mentor and teacher, urged his apprentice to "buy when there's blood in the streets", or words to that effect.

Clearly, anybody who's followed that kind of advice has had his head handed to him on a platter. For going on a year now, it seems like the crowd has been right and buyers or holders of stocks have gotten it all wrong. "Will this persist?" (like it looks like it will) is the wrong question to be asking. "How long will it last?" is, I believe, the right question.

We've heard that history repeats itself. With all the focus on what's happening now in the stock market, it seems that investors have, once again, pretty much discounted what's happened long, long ago. But that's not unusual; we're all prone to a bout with Outcome Bias every now and again. "It's different this time," we hear, ad nauseam. Yes, events are different this time. But human nature hasn't changed one whit in the last 1,000 years, and I seriously doubt it will before 2009 rolls to a close.

To that end, we've poured a lot of time into studying bullish and bearish sentiment and investor pain. Believing that investors really are predictably irrational, we want to learn what happened when investors sold stocks when everything was dismal and when they bought stocks when everything was rosy. I'm far from ready to offer any conclusions, but I'm happy to share our initial findings here.

If these charts pique your interest, your comments are welcome. Similarly, if you drop us a line, we'd be happy to chat.

AAII Sentiment Index

View more presentations from Jonathan Smith. (tags: sentiment market)

Investor Pain Index And Dow Jones Industrials

View more presentations from Jonathan Smith. (tags: pain investor)

If these charts pique your interest, your comments are welcome.  Similarly, if you drop us a line, we'd be happy to chat.

Will the Dow set a new low in 2009?

Call me old fashioned, but I think there are safer and surer ways to get paid while waiting than to own a contract, valued at approximately 79 cents on 2/3/2009, betting that the Dow will set a low that is lower than 7,449.38 sometime between now and year end. 

With stocks at multi-year lows and investor pain at multi-year highs, I'm pretty sure that going long the Intrade contract is not a bet I'd want to take...but that's what makes a market.  If I understand the value proposition correctly, the buyer who's willing to pay ~ 80 cents to own this contract, now believes that there's an 80% chance that he'll see lower lows than 7,449.38 sometime this year.  Conversely the seller who's willing to sell this contract for ~ 80 cents now believes that there's a 20% chance that he'll see lower lows than 7,449.39 this year.  See Disclosure and more beneath chart.  



[Disclosure - Jonathan Smith doesn't own this, or any, contract on Intrade (or any other prediction market) and isn' making any recommendations, bets, conjectures, whatsoever. For the record, his dowsing stick isn't any better than anybody else's. Intrade.com is a prediction market, and much ado has been made by the media about prediction markets. In case you're wondering what sort of payoff the buyer of the aforesaid contract gets for his ~ 80 cent investment if he wins. The answer is $1.00. On the other side of the transaction, the seller who sold the contract got ~ 80 cents for being willing to pay a buck if he loses. After he subtracts the ~ 80 cents he gets to keep from the buck he might have to pay out, he'll be out ~ 20 cents, and so you could say he thinks there's a 20% chance the Dow will go south of 7,449.38 in '09.]

By the way, this chart used with permission by Intrade.com.