Will the Dow set a new low in 2009?

Call me old fashioned, but I think there are safer and surer ways to get paid while waiting than to own a contract, valued at approximately 79 cents on 2/3/2009, betting that the Dow will set a low that is lower than 7,449.38 sometime between now and year end. 

With stocks at multi-year lows and investor pain at multi-year highs, I'm pretty sure that going long the Intrade contract is not a bet I'd want to take...but that's what makes a market.  If I understand the value proposition correctly, the buyer who's willing to pay ~ 80 cents to own this contract, now believes that there's an 80% chance that he'll see lower lows than 7,449.38 sometime this year.  Conversely the seller who's willing to sell this contract for ~ 80 cents now believes that there's a 20% chance that he'll see lower lows than 7,449.39 this year.  See Disclosure and more beneath chart.  



[Disclosure - Jonathan Smith doesn't own this, or any, contract on Intrade (or any other prediction market) and isn' making any recommendations, bets, conjectures, whatsoever. For the record, his dowsing stick isn't any better than anybody else's. Intrade.com is a prediction market, and much ado has been made by the media about prediction markets. In case you're wondering what sort of payoff the buyer of the aforesaid contract gets for his ~ 80 cent investment if he wins. The answer is $1.00. On the other side of the transaction, the seller who sold the contract got ~ 80 cents for being willing to pay a buck if he loses. After he subtracts the ~ 80 cents he gets to keep from the buck he might have to pay out, he'll be out ~ 20 cents, and so you could say he thinks there's a 20% chance the Dow will go south of 7,449.38 in '09.]

By the way, this chart used with permission by Intrade.com.

Pick-a-Pay Loans

Justin here. One of the worst financial inventions to come out of the housing boom has been the "Pick A Pay" loan.

Basically, the homeowner picks a payment they feel comfortable with, then they just pay it; it's as easy as that. You get a low payment, increasing house value, and big biceps (see picture) . . . well, not really.

What happens most of the time is that the homeowner is actually paying less than the interest! So the principal, instead of going down with every payment, actually GOES UP! You are essentially borrowing more money monthly. This was all well and good (though still not smart) while home values were rising. You can guess what happens when the house starts falling.

In May 2008, a San Francisco news station did a segment spotlighting the training videos that the company used (video here). It shows a scene where the homeowner asks the loan officer to clarify that he won't actually be paying down principal with this loan and the recommended response is "it's optional".

(Note: The company shown in the video was bought by another bank, which was bought by another bank, which then suspended the pick-a-pay program and then got bought by yet another bank.)

Days till we reach zero

On more down days than I'd like to admit, my team mates have heard me say, "At this rate, we'll be down to zero in no time."  Now they've started saying it before I can get the very words out of my mouth.  It's "tap code" at JSCO for a bit of gallows humor that our team uses to puts things back in perspective, to put the train back on the track, to put the cart behind the horse.  You get the point.  As any fool who can push a stick in the dirt can tell you, it's not going to go to zero, even though we sometimes think it will.

Stock markets are behaving as if all the indexes will go to zero in less than a month, maybe sooner. No one knows the future, but I for one have a hard time believing that this very real, very serious financial crisis will play out by going to zero. The Dow Jones Industrial Average, a proxy for the market, has in fact experienced record of volatility and panic selling this high only three times since December 31, 1946, the end of World War II:

• October 16, 2002, when the Dow Jones was 8,036.03
• November 9, 1987, when the Dow Jones was 1,900.20
• November 5, 1974, when the Dow Jones was 674.75

The summers of 1962, when the Dow Jones was 572, and 1970, when the Dow Jones was 874, experienced high but slightly lesser volatility and panic selling.   The chart below shows the Dow Jones Industrials and our fear and volatility indexes from December 31, 1946 to the present.  Click the chart to full size. 

No one knows where and when all this panic will land.  Some wonder if it ever will.  It will.  History records that extreme volatility and panic selling do not last indefinately.  At some point, the invisible hand of Adam Smith kicks in and eliminates whatever shortage exists.  Some would say his invisible hand has already been working off the shortage of buyers.  Extreme volatility and panic selling provide wonderful opportunities to buy shares of excellent businesses at bargain prices.  Today's headlines are rarely the same as what history's judgement is going to be. 

If you haven't already seen it, study the wonderfully perceptive presentation by Weston Wellington of Dimensional Fund Advisors that Justin described in his post of October 2, part of which is below:

• "Earlier this week, I came across a presentation by Weston Wellington with Dimensional Fund Advisors, called "Is It Different This Time?" Wellington reviews our nation's past and, in particular, the media's reaction during those time. He does a great job of bringing some perspective to a volatile time.  (Justin said viewing it was guaranteed to lower blood pressure 20 points for every viewing.  If current levels of volatility and panic don't ease up soon, I'll need to view it several times a day.  I guess there could be lot worse things than reinforcing one's long-term perspective. 

This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security, market, or an endorsement of any investment philosophy, firm, or process.  This is just a call to sit down, take a breath, and study history.

Enemies in the financial markets are fierce warriors

Jonathan here. Having just talked with his friend in Manhattan, Dick Barron, business reporter at the Greensboro-News Record, writes, in his BizBytes newsletter (click here, follow instructions to subscribe to BizBytes)

• "As one of my friends in Manhattan wrote today on [his] Twitter [page]: "Just walked to Wall Street for a meeting and back. The mood on the street is weird. Everyone looks weak, frightened and angry, like on 9/11" [emphasis mine].

Sun Tzu wrote The Art of War in the 6th century BC. His military strategies are still being taught.

• “Draw them in with the prospect of gain. Take them by confusion. Use anger to throw them into disarray."

Understanding Sun Tzu's brilliant strategies puts the unprecedented economic events and (investors' unprecedented reactions) into perspective.

• Investors have been drawn in with the prospect of gain.
• Investors have been taken by confusion.
• Investors have been thrown into disarray.

You need allies in your war. When the News-Record called us during Monday's 504 point drop in the Dow, we said investors needed to "take a deep breath," and we explained why we didn't need to "stay glued to the TV for the latest headline." Click here to read the article.

Fighting ShortTermism

Here's a great little piece from the WSJ today, Don't Give Up on That Fund - Not Yet.

. . . the study, conducted by Baird Advisory Services Research, looked at more than 1,300 funds, defining "high performers" as those that topped their benchmark by one percentage point annually over the 10 years ended in 2007. About 505 funds qualified.

The key finding was that many of these top funds went through periods where they got killed by the market or their peer group. More than three-quarters of these high achievers had at least one three-year stretch where the fund lagged behind its benchmark by one percentage point or more. More than half of the funds experienced benchmark underperformance of three percentage points or more, and nearly one-third of them lagged behind by five percentage points or more in a three-year period.

Despite those bouts of underperformance, the funds were able to be superior achievers over the full 10-year window.

Tim Byrne, director of Baird's Private Wealth Management Research, Products and Services, said the moral of the study is that even the best money managers have periods where they don't look so good, but the longer an investor sticks with them the better the chances for success, for high performance over time.

"The problem is that people buy a fund after the manager has proven that they are a high performer, but they sell the first time there's a problem," Mr. Byrne said. "They wind up chasing performance -- buying high and selling low -- instead of sticking with a manager who has proven that they can deliver if you give them enough time."

Short-termism

The chart (click to enlarge) shows annual turnover rate (churn rate) for shares of NYSE listed companies. The black axis (Y1) shows annual turnover increasing dramatically from 10 to 30 percent during 1940 to 1980. During 1998 to 2008, turnover increased from 76 to 139 percent. Time held (years) is shown on the red axis (Y2); each NYSE share was "held" continuously by an investor four to eight years, presumably before it was sold, during 1940 to 1980. In the last ten years, this "holding period" has been punctuated from sixteen months to down to less than 9 months.

• Such a churn rate imparts higher transaction costs to investors; with greater trading also comes the risk of making greater mistakes.
• An investment requiring 2 - 3 years time for the market to recognize potential increases in intrinsic value faces unprecedented opposition, in an environment that typically keeps its shares less than nine months before selling to buy another.
• Corporate managements, under ever increasing pressure from stockholders, financial analysts, global competitors, and takeover groups sacrifice long-term strategic vision in the pursuit of beating "next quarter's earnings guidance."
• In contrast, a group of Fortune most admired corporations for "long-term investment" had an average turnover rate of close to 60 percent in 2005.
  

Short-termism destroys wealth. CFA® Institute occupies the forefront in a vital challenge to raise awareness and to challenge the wide range of short-termism's stakeholders to exercise leadership in the effort to win a war against the unnecessary destruction of capital. CFA® Institute's excellent resources may be accessed here.

source: NYSE Factbook, Forbes, CFA® Institute, Jonathan Smith & Co.

The Golden Toilet

Justin here. Meir Statman once said that rational investors are investors who “always prefer more wealth to less and are indifferent as to whether a given increment to their wealth takes the form of cash payments or an increase in the market value of their holdings of shares.”

I don't know when we started misquoting him, but in our office we are constantly reminding each other that "rational investors are not concerned with the timing or form of wealth."

For example, a rational investor would be indifferent to $50 won on a lottery ticket, $50 in a Christmas card, $50 from the Home Depot returns desk, or $50 from a paycheck. I don't know about you, but for whatever reason, I spend the Christmas and Home Depot dollars very differently.

I thought about Professor Statman as I read this article in the Wall Street Journal about Lam Sai-wing, a Hong Kong entrepreneur who built his fortune around a golden toilet.

Mr. Lam owned a jewelry manufacturing company and was contemplating how to turn it into a successful retail venture. His idea to make a golden toilet (when gold was $200/ounce) eventually snowballed into a golden palace that, at its height, attracted 100 tourist groups per day and did $100 million in sales annually.

Mr. Lam seemed to be doing the rational thing when gold hit its peak at $1,003.20 - he started selling off the palace bit by bit. See if you can find where the rational turns to irrational.

He is melting down golden chandeliers, armchairs and armored knights and selling gold by the ton to fuel growth plans that include hundreds of new retail outlets in mainland China. But even with the selloff, one thing is certain: the toilet stays.

"I don't care if gold hits $10,000 an ounce," Mr. Lam says. "I'm not melting it down."

Interesting. He'll sell everything else at a gain somewhere under 200% but won't sell the toilet, even if it goes up 4,900% or roughly 10x the historic peak! Talk about flushing money down the toilet.

Predictably Irrational

John Tierny published an article February 26, 2008 titled The Advantages of Closing a Few Doors. A devotee of Dan Ariely's informative discoveries about how humans make all sorts of decisions, most of which are hazardous to our financial, physical, and emotional health, Tierny lays out a careful explanation.



You don't need to be a Ph.D. to know humans have a love affair with our options, and there are no lengths we won't go to keep as many options open. It's when we see the doors closing on our options, as doors invariably do, we respond, not in rational ways, but in normal human, ways.



If you like keeping options open (I know I sure do) take the online test at Tierny Lab.



Further Reading: "Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions." Dan Ariely; HarperCollins, 2008.



"Keeping Doors Open: The Effect of Unavailability on Incentives to Keep Options Viable." Jiwoong Shin, Dan Ariely. Management Science, May 2004. (PDF)