I lost the toss

Jonathan here. My February 3 post, Will the Dow Set a New low in 2009, is the most stupid post I've ever written. Not because my thesis was wrong (it was), but in our line of work, focusing on process over outcome is what it's all about, and in the clarity of hindsight, I was focusing on outcome not process. So now that I've had my whipping, eaten crow, and been avoided at the water cooler by my colleagues, I wanted to share just a bit about what we know and think about market sentiment, or more precisely, investor sentiment. Sage investors know investors become buyers when the consensus gets cheerful. Warren Buffett said "you pay a high price for a cheerful consensus." Ben Graham, Buffett's mentor and teacher, urged his apprentice to "buy when there's blood in the streets", or words to that effect.

Clearly, anybody who's followed that kind of advice has had his head handed to him on a platter. For going on a year now, it seems like the crowd has been right and buyers or holders of stocks have gotten it all wrong. "Will this persist?" (like it looks like it will) is the wrong question to be asking. "How long will it last?" is, I believe, the right question.

We've heard that history repeats itself. With all the focus on what's happening now in the stock market, it seems that investors have, once again, pretty much discounted what's happened long, long ago. But that's not unusual; we're all prone to a bout with Outcome Bias every now and again. "It's different this time," we hear, ad nauseam. Yes, events are different this time. But human nature hasn't changed one whit in the last 1,000 years, and I seriously doubt it will before 2009 rolls to a close.

To that end, we've poured a lot of time into studying bullish and bearish sentiment and investor pain. Believing that investors really are predictably irrational, we want to learn what happened when investors sold stocks when everything was dismal and when they bought stocks when everything was rosy. I'm far from ready to offer any conclusions, but I'm happy to share our initial findings here.

If these charts pique your interest, your comments are welcome. Similarly, if you drop us a line, we'd be happy to chat.

AAII Sentiment Index

View more presentations from Jonathan Smith. (tags: sentiment market)

Investor Pain Index And Dow Jones Industrials

View more presentations from Jonathan Smith. (tags: pain investor)

If these charts pique your interest, your comments are welcome.  Similarly, if you drop us a line, we'd be happy to chat.

Recipe for Disaster: Keeping Up With The Joneses

Justin here. The single best (and by far most fascinating) explanation I've found of the current financial crisis is This American Life’s The Giant Pool of Money episode that aired on NPR. (You can listen to the 30 second promo here, the full story here, or read the transcript here.)

Mostly because excerpts like this:

“I wouldn't have loaned me the money. And nobody that I know would have loaned me the money. I know guys who are criminals who wouldn't loan me that and they break your knee-caps. I don’t know why the bank did it. I’m serious ... $540,000 to a person with bad credit.”

It made me realized that the sole cause of the crisis (literally ... the ... sole ... cause) is this: the need to keep up with the Joneses.

At every level of the chain: from countries needing to boost their investment returns so they sell out of treasuries and go to higher yielding alternatives, to homeowners taking out mortgages and second mortgages because their neighbors and friends are, to mortgage brokers creating riskier and riskier loans because their competition are, to banks buying those mortgages because the other banks are buying them.

The desire to “keep up” overtook the need to act rationally. I urge you to read or listen to it. Below are some more excerpts (emphasis mine) and my key takeaway:

"An interesting fact, here. Mike Garner's bank did not care how risky these mortgages were. This was the new era: banks didn't have to hold on to these mortgages for 30 years. They didn’t have to wait and see if they’d be paid back. Bank's like Garner's just owned them for a month or two and then sold them on to Wall Street. Wall Street would sell them on to the global pool of money."

And this:

"No income no asset loans. That's a liar's loan. We are telling you to lie to us. We're hoping you don't lie. Tell us what you make, tell us what you have in the bank, but we won't verify? We’re setting you up to lie. Something about that feels very wrong. It felt wrong way back when and I wish we had never done it. Unfortunately, what happened ... we did it because everyone else was doing it."

And lastly, this about the current and future landscape:

"The global pool of money is avoiding anything with even the slightest hint of risk and that affects everybody, no matter who you are. It's harder to borrow money to buy a house, or build a factory, or bring your country boldly into the 21st century."

My key takeaway is this: things are generally not as good or as bad as they seem.

Translation: if Mr. Market underpriced risk on the outset of this mess (ie - he bought risky securities he shouldn’t have), is it so crazy to think that Mr. Market could overprice risk today (ie – Mr. Market might not be buying some low risk securities that he should be buying?)

2:30 pm on April 28, 2004, did you know where your SEC Commissioners were?

Stephen Labaton, in an article he published October 3 in the New York Times, provides a close up look into one of the most arcane moments of 2008, so far.  Labaton explains how an obscure Securities and Exchange Commission decision led to an out of control financial crisis.  Read it, and you'll see why Senator John S. McCain, on the day he was quoted as saying, "If I were President of the United States, I would fire Christopher Cox today.  (That's Mr. Cox, on the left, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Roel C. Campos, on the right, at a House hearing in 2007. Mr. Campos was on the commission in 2004 when a decision was made to change the net capital rule for big investment banks.  Mr. Cox appears to be listening out of both ears.)  As recently as March 11, 2008, Chairman Cox has said, "We have a good deal of comfort about the capital cushions at these firms at the moment.”  How do you like that?  I've read Labaton's article, silently.  I've read it, out loud.  I've read it to anyone who will listen.   And I ask the same question every time: how could Mr. Cox have been so wrong?  Give it a read. 

The editors of the Times, with whom I disagree often, published a 4 minute slideshow of the April 28, 2004 meeting (pay close attention to Item #2) between SEC Commissioners and the heads of JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, and Goldman Sachs, in a basement conference room at the office of the SEC.   Reading the article and viewing the audio slideshow won't lower your blood pressure, but it will provide valuable insights that the talking heads haven't. 

I'm interested in what you think about this.  I invite you to use the "comments section" found beneath this post.